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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper addresses rock slopes, specifically rock 
slope instabilities. In this context, the mechanics un-
derlying instabilities and corresponding models are 
very briefly reviewed to provide a basis for the ma-
jor topic of this paper: Decision making as applied to 
risk management of rock slopes. 
Before further outlining the structure and context 
of this paper, it is necessary to define the rock slope 
instabilities that will be considered. There are sev-
eral differing definitions, e.g. Goodman and Kieffer 
(2000); Cruden and Varnes (1996); Varnes (1958), 
and what will be used here are the two categories, 
“rock slides” and “rock falls”. Possible subcatego-
ries for rock slides are planar wedge-, rotational 
slides; toppling will also be considered in this cate-
gory. For rockfalls, movement of single blocks in 
form of falling, jumping and rolling will be included 
as well as rock avalanches consisting of multiple 
rock blocks interacting in a flow-like mechanism. 
Simply looking at these instability processes will 
quickly lead to the conclusion that it is often not 
possible to clearly separate them, e.g. a rotational 
slide may end up as an avalanche. In the mechanism 
discussion in Section 4 some simplifying assump-
tions will be made to identify the major underlying 
mechanisms. 
The eventual goal of this paper and, most impor-
tantly, of most practical applications is to assess and 
manage risk associated with rock slope instabilities 
by making appropriate decisions. Hence, it is advan-
tageous to organize this paper using the classic flow 
chart for decision making under uncertainty, based 
on Pratt et al. (1965), and expanded and imple-
mented by the authors (Einstein and Karam, 2001) 
(Figure 1). 
As one can see, one collects information on the 
state-of-nature, then models the phenomenon deter-
ministically and probabilistically to end up with risk, 
which is the basis for decisions in form of various 
risk management options. Consequently, the follow-
ing sections will first discuss information collection, 
then geometric and mechanical modelling, followed 
by risk determination and risk management. Given 
that this is a relatively short keynote paper, only 
snapshots of what is done with emphasis on new 
technologies/procedures can be provided. The 
authors hope that the readers understand that many 
relevant references can, therefore not be mentioned. 
 
 
Figure 1. Decision-Making under Uncertainty. Based on Pratt et 
al. (1965) and Expanded by Einstein and Karam (2001) (U = 
Updating). 
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2 INFORMATION COLLECTION ON THE 
STATE-OF-NATURE 
 
One can differentiate two major aspects on which in-
formation needs to be collected:  
1. The geometric and geologic/geotechnical char-
acteristics.  
2. Movements. In most cases, movements or, 
more generally expressed, changes are obtained 
from repeated observations of geometric and geo-
logic conditions. 
The geometric and geologic features, in addition 
to the surface geometry, are the location and extent 
of discontinuities (faults, fractures, bedding planes). 
Modern technology using e.g. LIDAR InSAR, 
Ground Based Radar but also photography and total 
stations provide the information for sophisticated 
image analysis and eventually two - or three-
dimensional models. Good examples of extensive 
use of these technologies are discussed e.g. by 
Blikra (2008), Ferrero et al. (2007). What is right 
now still somewhat problematic, is obtaining de-
tailed information at depth where one has to still rely 
on boreholes possibly supplemented by geophysical 
ground penetrating techniques. 
 
 
3 GEOMETRIC MODELLING 
 
As indicated above, three dimensional models of the 
rock surface with intersecting discontinuities can be 
relatively easily created. These are actually good ex-
amples of deterministic models. As hinted at above, 
the situation is quite different when going into depth, 
where the information both on geometric and geo-
logic/geotechnical aspects is uncertain. Regarding 
geometry, this concerns mostly the location, shape 
and size of fractures and to a lesser extent, the 
boundaries of different lithologies. Fracture (discon-
tinuity) geometry, in particular, cannot be determi-
nistically described at this point. Geologic/geotech-
nical information is somewhat easier to obtain 
deterministically, e.g. from bore cores or water level 
observations. Nevertheless, there is some spatial 
variation also with regard to these characteristics. 
Models have to reflect the spatial variation of geo-
metric and geologic characteristics and the informa-
tion collection procedures have to consider/correct 
for random errors and biases. For a review of uncer-
tainties in rock mechanics and - engineering and 
how to handle them, see Einstein (2003), also 
Mauldon (1995) and Zhang and Einstein (1998).  
Spatial uncertainty e.g. of fractures can be cap-
tured with stochastic models such as Fracman, (see 
e.g. Dershowitz & La Pointe (2007)), which is in 
wide commercial use, and Geofrac (Ivanova and 
Einstein (2004)), which can consider the underlying 
geologic genesis (Fig. 2). These probabilistic geo-
metric models can be used together with mechanistic 
models (see Section 4) to represent rock mass be-
havior, namely deformation including failure but 
also flow. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Stochastic Hierarchical Modeling of Fractures Using 
Geofrac. (Ivanova and Einstein, 2004) 
 
 
4 MECHANISTIC MODELS 
 
Although the title of this paper mentions “mechan-
ics” but not the just discussed geometry, it will be-
come quickly apparent that the two cannot be sepa-
rated. Before addressing this issue, a few purely 
mechanics oriented comments need to be made: 
Rock slope instabilities usually involve two basic 
mechanism:  
1. Detachment, including failure followed by: 2. 
Movement of the entire slope or of individual blocks 
(Fig. 3). 
A few possible detachment mechanisms are 
shown in Figure 4. Movement can then occur in 
form of translational or rotational sliding, through 
toppling, through falling, jumping or rolling of sin-
gle blocks or interacting blocks within an avalanche. 
Clearly this is a simplification in that e.g. several of 
the detachment mechanisms in Figure 3 can occur 
simultaneously and a large initially coherent rock 
mass may break up during movement, i.e. detach-
ment and movement mechanisms may interact. In 
the following paragraphs, one example each of the 
detachment mechanism and the movement mecha-
nism will be illustrated with physical experiments 
and associated numerical/analytical models. A final 
example will be the application of numerical models 
to an actual rockslide. These examples have been 
chosen since they represent the most recent informa-
tion on the particular mechanisms or, in the last case, 
an example of interaction between model and in situ 
observations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Examples of detachment and movement mechanisms: 
a) detach, start to slide at 1, separate in tension at 2, b) move.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Shear b) Tension c) Tilting 
 
Figure 4. Detachment Mechanisms. 
 
 
One of the major problematic issues regarding 
rock slope stability is the fact that fractures (joints) 
are not persistent and for detachment both for sliding 
and rockfalls to happen, the intact rock bridges need 
to fail. In other words, fracture coalescence needs to 
occur. An extensive investigation of crack coales-
cence is being conducted at MIT revealing a number 
of different coalescence modes (Figure 5). These ob-
servations come from laboratory scale tests on gyp-
sum, marble and granite representing a reasonably 
wide range of grain sizes (textures) and mineral 
composition. The scale is clearly smaller than frac-
ture coalescence in rock masses. So these observa-
tions might serve as a scaled model, and Wong and 
Einstein (2007) have shown that such a scaling is to 
some extent acceptable. Also and very importantly, 
the small scale mechanisms are an actual part of the 
failure of intact rock bridges consisting of the crea-
tion, propagation and eventual coalescence of cracks 
and fractures. Read’s research group, see e.g. (Yan 
et al. (2007)) has been able to model the mecha-
nisms numerically using the hybrid FE/DE (ELFEN) 
model. Similar reasonably satisfactory modeling re-
sults were obtained by Bobet (1998) using a bound-
ary element model. Pierce et al., (2007) show how 
the Particle Flow Code can be used to model these 
cracking mechanisms. Although reasonably success-
ful, some investigators, (e.g. Wong (2010); Silva 
(2009)), have shown that one cannot correctly repre-
sent all material/geometric combinations with these 
models. Clearly, the aim is to combine the stochastic 
geometry models with the mechanical models to 
completely represent slope failures. Initial steps have 
been taken in the past, (see e.g. Lee et al. (1992)) 
where slopes with stochastic joint patterns as shown 
in Figure 2 can be combined with mechanistic mod-
els to predict the probability of failure of a rock 
slope. 
A similar combination of laboratory experiments 
and of numerical methods to investigate the mechan-
ics is used by Manzella (Manzella and Labiouse 
(2009, 2007), Manzella (2009, 2008)) for rock ava-
lanches. The mechanisms were experimentally simu-
lated by assembling masses of differently shaped 
granular material or blocks and letting this mass 
slide down a ramp ending in a horizontal surface. 
The mass disintegrates and spreads during this proc-
ess and depending  on  grain  size,  material,  friction  
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Figure 5. Crack Coalescence Patterns for Gypsum, Marble and 
Granite (Wong and Einstein, 2009).  
T= Tension Cracks; S=Shear Cracks 
 
 
angle, volume, fall height and ramp inclination dif-
ferent runout distances, spreads, and pile heights re-
sult (Figure 6). After detailed characterization of the 
material including nano-indentation technologies, 
numerical modeling using the discrete element code, 
MIMES, (Williams and O’Connor, 1999) led to sat-
isfactorily comparable results albeit, only in two-
dimensions for the time being.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Physical Modeling of Runout/Pileup of Rock Ava-
lanche. (from Manzella and Labiouse. 2007, 2008) 
 
a) Different released quantities. Top curve 40 liters -7067 
simulation elements; Bottom curve 20 liters – 3504 simulation 
elements. 
b) 40 liter (7067 simulation elements) released in one (dark 
curve) and in two pulses (light curve). 
c) Two subsequent 20 liter (3504 simulation element) runs – 
dark curve first run, light curve second run. 
 
Figure 7. Rock Avalanche Experiments (left side) and Numeri-
cal Simulations (right side) (From Manzella, 2008, 2009). 
 
 
This is shown in Figure 7 where the experiments 
(left column) and numerical results (right column) 
show similar effects on deposit morphology and 
runout for different released quantities and progres-
sive failure. 
The last example involves the application of nu-
merical models and a comparison with field observa-
tions in a stepwise process leading to a final accept-
able result, (Kveldsvik et al. (2009)). This is based 
on Kveldsvik’s doctoral research on the Åknes rock 
slope in Norway, which is moving. He used DDA 
(Discontinuous Deformation Analysis, see Shi, 
1988) and UDEC (Universal Distinct Element Code, 
see Cundall, 1980) in this analysis. In the DDA 
work, “DDA Backward” was used. Specifically, 
blocks based on geologic interpretation of the slope 
were used as input together with measured dis-
placements. The difference between measured and 
modeled displacements was used to modify the 
block geometry. All in all, 10 models were exam-
ined to lead from the initial block geometry to the 
finally chosen one (Figures 8a, b). The finally cho-
sen model reflects the observed fact that the upper 
part of the slope moves more than the lower one. 
The UDEC analysis was conducted on a vertical 
cross section (Figure 9). In this case measured fric-
tion angles, ground water levels and fracture patterns 
were used as input to determine at which depth it is 
most likely that failure along the slope parallel folia-
tion fractures and less steeply inclined outcropping 
fractures occurs. So in combination the two models 
provide reasonable information on possible mecha-
nisms. Nevertheless, as Kveldsvik et al., (2009) 
point out, there are quite a few uncertainties as to 
which of the failure mechanisms actually acts. In the 
particular case of Åknes continued displacement- 
and water level measurements can help in making 
safety relevant decisions, even if the models cannot 
(yet?) be used in a complete prediction. 
 
Figure 8a. Åknes Rock Slope - DDA Analysis. Initial Block 
Model and Annual Average Slope Displacements Derived from 
Photogrammetry 1983-2004 (From Kveldsvik et al., 2009). 
 
 
Figure 8b. Åknes Rock Slope - DDA Analysis Proposed Final 
Block Model. Note Differences in Upper Part Compared to 
Figure 8a. From Kveldsvik et al. (2009). 
 
Clearly, determining models through back- analysis 
of observed behavior and recalibrating and checking 
them with continuous observations is the ideal ap-
proach. It is hampered by the fact that rock slope in-
stabilities are ill-defined problems leading to differ-
 
 
 
ent models satisfying the same observations. This 
problem limits the use of the models in making pre-
dictions and is known as model uncertainty, which 
has been discussed extensively by the authors, (Ein-
stein and Karam (2001), Karam (2005), and Sousa 
(2010)). 
 
 
 
a) 
 
 
 
b) 
 
 
 
c) 
 
a) UDEC Model 
b) Largest shear displacement of fractures at 200 m depth and 
outcropping fractures 
c) Largest shear displacement of fractures at 20 m depth and 
outcropping fracture 
 
Figure 9. Åknes Rock Slope – UDEC Modelling of Potential 
Displacement along Foliation Fractures and Outcropping Frac-
tures. From Kveldsvik et al., (2009). 
So both the comments on geometry and geomet-
ric models, and on the mechanisms and mechanical 
models indicate that it is necessary to assess and 
consider uncertainties through probabilistic model-
ing, which as indicated in Figure 1 is the next phase 
of the decision making process. 
 
 
5 PROBABILISTIC MODELS AND RISK DE-
TERMINATION 
 
Model uncertainty, which was just discussed is only 
one of the sources of uncertainty affecting slope in-
stability and geotechnical engineering in general: 
1. Inherent spatial and temporal variability 
2. Measurement errors (random or systematic) 
3. Statistical fluctuation 
4. Model uncertainty 
5. Omissions 
Another way of describing uncertainties is 
- Epistemic uncertainty (lack of knowledge) 
- Aleatory uncertainty (randomness) 
The different types of uncertainties have been 
discussed in the past, (Baecher (1978); Einstein and 
Baecher (1987); Lacasse and Nadim (1998)) so only 
a few additional points are made here: 
- The uncertainties, except omissions, have both 
an epistemic and a random component 
- A good example of inherent spatial uncertainty 
are the joint patterns discussed earlier 
Given all this, probabilistic models of rock slope 
stability, also called rock slope reliability models, 
have been in use for many years, e.g. CANMET 
(1976); Piteau and Martin (1977); Call and Nicholas 
(1978). Low (1996) developed a spreadsheet based 
approach for wedge instabilities, one of the classic 
rock slope stability problems. This approach allows 
one to consider uncertainties in the geometry of the 
wedge, in the material properties (unit weight, cohe-
sion and friction angle) and in water level to derive 
the Hasofer and Lind (1974) reliability index. This 
approach has been extended to single plane dynamic 
problems by Christian and Urzua (1998). Other 
probabilistic approaches use Monte Carlo simula-
tion, e.g. Piteau and Martin (1977), dynamic pro-
gramming, e.g. Lee and Einstein, (1992) or FORM, 
e.g. Duzgun et al., (2003); for a review of these and 
other approaches, see Nadim et al. (2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this paper a simple approach for a rock-slide as 
shown in Figure 10 will be used (simplifications in-
clude: infinite slope, linear Coulomb failure crite-
rion, groundwater level as shown in Figure 10). This 
leads, with the uncertainties listed in Figure 10, to 
the probability of failure shown in Figure 11, namely 
P(FS<1) = 0.207. Combining the hazard with conse-
quences leads to risk: 
Risk = Probability of Threat × Worth of Loss  
 = Hazard × Consequences. 
Otherwise expressed:  
 
R = P[T] × u (X) 
 
where 
R = Risk 
P[T] = Hazard 
U(X) = utility of consequences where (X) is a 
vector of attributes (see Keeney and Raiffa, (1976), 
Baecher, (1981)) 
This expression can be expanded to express the 
fact that consequences are uncertain by including the 
so-called vulnerability, which can be expressed by 
the conditional probability P[X|T] leading, in the 
case of a single attribute X, to:  
 
R = P[T] x P[X|T] x U(X) 
 
All this has been discussed in detail earlier, e.g. 
Einstein (1997); Fell (2005). The reason for repeat-
ing this here is because it serves as a basis for the 
application of the decision making process in Sec-
tion 6. Before doing this it has to be pointed out that, 
instead of working with risk, which implies associat-
ing values with the consequences (monetary values 
or utilities) one can work with hazard. This is often 
desirable if one cannot or does not want associate 
values with consequences, e.g. in case of life loss. In 
the rock slope instability domain, applications using 
hazard only are e.g. the rockfall hazard systems 
(New York State, 1990) or FN diagrams (Fig. 12). 
 
 
Figure 10. Example Rock Slope Stability Problem (c’ = effec-
tive cohesion, φ’ = effective friction angle, γw = water unit 
weight, γr = rock mass unit weight). 
 
Figure 11. Probability of Failure for Rock Slope shown in Fig. 
10. Hazard = P[Threat] = P[Factor of safety < 1] = 0.207 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. FN Diagram – Example for Hong Kong (Ho et al., 
2000). ALARP = As Low as Reasonably Practical 
 
 
6 RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
As seen in Figure 1, this is the final block of the de-
cision-making flow diagram. It represents the most 
important practical aspect since it is here where 
“something can be done about risk”; it is also central 
to this paper through the application of the decision-
making approach and application of new concepts. 
Possible management actions are, as shown with the 
decision tree in Figure 13: No action, active and pas-
sive countermeasures as well as warning systems, 
where the latter can be considered a type of passive 
countermeasure. An additional action, which will be 
treated separately, is collecting new information. 
Decision trees have the advantage of systematically 
 
 
 
 
organizing the process. They can become quite in-
volved for complex processes, however. In the fol-
lowing, the rock slope failure example of Figure 10 
will be used to demonstrate the different risk man-
agement actions. 
 
 
Figure 13. Decision Tree for Rock Slope Instability Problems. 
 
 
Figure 14. Decision Tree Rock Slope Instability– No Action. 
 
 
The no-action decision tree illustrated in Figure 
14 illustrates the base case, i.e. failure occurring 
with a particular probability (20.7%) and having dif-
ferent vulnerabilities or, as in Figure 14, different 
probabilities of the various damage levels where 
these damage levels are expressed by different utili-
ties. By multiplying and summing the numbers in 
Figure 14, one obtains the risk of “-2691” without 
any countermeasures. 
Countermeasures reduce risk but do so at a cost. 
Specifically, active countermeasures reduce the haz-
ard, i.e. produce a lower probability of failure and a 
reduced risk R′ 
 
R′ i = P′ [T] + P[Xi|T] + u (Xi) + u (Cact) 
 
where  
P′  [T] = reduced probability of threat 
Cact = cost of active countermeasures 
Other terms as before 
For active countermeasures to be worthwhile R′  
should be less than R, where R is the risk associated 
with “no action”. The decision tree for the case with 
active countermeasures is shown in Fig. 15. Exam-
ples of active countermeasures are bolts (anchors) 
and retaining structures. 
 
 
 
With passive countermeasures, the vulnerability 
is reduced 
 
R′ = P [T] + P′ [X|T] + u (X) + u (Cpas) 
 
where  
P′ [X|T] = reduced vulnerability 
Cpas = cost of passive countermeasures 
Again R′ should be less than R for passive coun-
termeasures to be worthwhile. The corresponding 
decision tree is shown in Figure 16. Examples of 
passive countermeasures are, for instance, rockfall 
nets or protective sheds. 
 
 
Figure 15. Decision Tree Rock Slope Instability – Active 
Countermeasure. The probability of Failure, i.e. the Hazard has 
been Reduced: 
P′ [T] = r × P[T]; r = 0.25 in this example. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Decision Tree Rock Slope Instability – Passive 
Countermeasure. Vulnerabilities have been changed from No 
Action (Compare to Fig. 14). 
 
 
For both active and passive countermeasures, one 
could, in principle, include the probability that the 
countermeasure is successful but one usually does 
not do this. This is different in warning systems and 
one of the reasons why they are treated separately, 
although they are also a passive countermeasure. 
There is a reasonable probability that on the one 
hand warning systems do not work or on the other 
hand, that false alarms are issued. These possibilities 
need to be included and, consequently, lead to rather 
involved decision trees as shown in Figure 17, which 
includes the reliability of the warning system (warn-
ing issued when it should – when it should not, 
warning not issued when it should not – when it 
should). It is quite evident when looking at Figure 
17 that the tree is complete but also cumbersome. 
This is even more so as the entire decision tree actu-
 
ally consists of all trees in Figures 14 to 17! This is 
where Bayesian networks come in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Decision Tree for Rock Slope Instability – Warning System. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Bayesian Network Applied to Rock Slope Instability Problem with Possible Decisions No Action, Active Countermea-
sures, Passive countermeasures and Warning System. 
 
 
A Bayesian network, also known as belief net-
work, is a “graphical representation of knowledge 
for reasoning under uncertainty”, or as stated by 
Russell and Norvig (1995), “A concise graphical 
representation of the joint probability of the domain 
represented by random variables.” Bayesian net-
works encode conditional independencies between 
variables, which simplify and allow one to compute 
the joint probability of a domain more efficiently. 
This is illustrated in Figure 18. The application of 
the Bayesian network to the decision problem in-
cluding warning systems is shown in Figure 19. In 
this figure the matrices for the warning system reli-
ability, threat probability (hazard), cost of the coun-
termeasures (active, passive, warning system) and 
cost of consequences are shown. 
Typical warning systems for rock slope failures 
are based on observations of displacements as e.g. 
proposed by Blikra (2008) and shown in Figure 20. 
The final result of the entire decision making 
process be this done with decision trees or Bayesian 
networks is shown in Figure 21. One ends up with 
final utilities for each of the actions and selects the 
one with the lowest (negative) utility, i.e., the lowest 
risk, which in this example is the warning system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Principle of Bayesian Network. 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Warning System Based on Rock Slope Dis-
placements for Åknes Rock Slope. Synthetic Figure Making 
Use of Historical Data at Åknes and Experience with Other 
Rock Slopes, from Blikra (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Decision Making for Rock Slope Instability Prob-
lem Using Bayesian Network and Decision Tree. Results of No 
Action, Active Countermeasure, Passive Countermeasure and 
Warning Systems. 
 
 
The reader will correctly note that this decision is 
based on many numbers that can vary i.e. are uncer-
tain. For instance the consequence costs can vary 
and so can the “active reduction factor r” (Figure 
15); other probabilistic values such as the probability 
of failure or the vulnerability or the warning sys-
tem’s reliability can have other values (uncertainty 
of the uncertainty). It is, therefore, beneficial to con-
duct sensitivity analyses. Figure 22 investigates the 
effect of the probability of threat (P[T] = Hazard) 
against different actions. As to be expected, for very 
low failure probabilities, no action is preferred, oth-
erwise it is the warning system, except for very high 
probabilities where active countermeasure are pre-
ferred. This is only one example and the sensitivity 
of the decision to other factors needs to be similarly 
investigated. 
One last issue needs to be addressed in the con-
text of decision making (under uncertainty) for rock 
slopes instability and natural threats in general. This 
relates to collecting additional information, which 
will lead to an updating of the entire decision proc-
ess as indicated in Figure 1. There are two possibili-
ties for updating with new information: 
1. Information collected after decision 
2. Information collected before decision 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Rock Slope Instability Problem – Sensitivity Analy-
sis for Varying Hazard P[Threat]. 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Bayesian Network for Decision Making Including 
“Virtual Exploration” for Rock Slope Instability Problem. 
 
 
Updating with information collected after the de-
cision is the standard procedure of e.g. mapping ad-
ditional fractures, observing water levels in bore-
holes, and with this update the state of nature and/of 
the hazard. This may then lead to a different final 
decision. 
Updating with information collected before the 
decision is a two step process involving so called 
virtual exploration as a first step and then deciding 
which countermeasures to take based on this virtual 
exploration. This requires an additional set of 
branches in the decision tree or an additional node in 
the Bayesian network, which represent the informa-
tion from the virtual exploration influencing the haz-
ard (Figure 23). This new information is uncertain, 
which has to be reflected in the virtual exploration. 
All this is considered with Bayesian updating in pre-
posterior analysis and has been used for tunnel ex-
ploration, (Karam et al. (2007)). Efforts are under 
way at present to develop this also for rock slopes. 
The results will be a utility (cost) of the best (lowest 
negative utility) action given the virtual exploration. 
The difference between this number and the utility 
without virtual information is called Expected Value 
of Sample Information (EVSI). If EVSI is greater 
than the cost of the exploration, one will decide to 
conduct the exploration. This is schematically shown 
in Figure 1 and completes the description of possible 
decision making for rockslope “instabilities”. 
 
 
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
The decision making process as outlined in Figure 1 
has been used to briefly review how one proceeds 
from information collection on the state of nature to 
risk management regarding rock slope instabilities 
be they slides or related instabilities, or rock falls. 
Some detailed comments were made about recent 
work on failure mechanisms and modeling them. It 
becomes apparent that while advances have been 
made regarding our understanding of failure mecha-
nisms, much seems to be inconclusive or uncertain. 
This, together with other uncertainties, is the reason 
why the process of decision making under uncer-
tainty is ideally suited to the rock slope instability 
problem. Consequently, the paper shows how this 
can be applied emphasizing risk management con-
sisting of a choice of decisions between no action, 
active and passive countermeasures, and warning 
systems. 
Practical tools to support the decision making 
process are the classic decision tree or Bayesian 
networks. The use of the latter represents a new de-
velopment. Both tools allow one to conduct sensitiv-
ity analyses, which are absolutely essential when 
dealing with processes that include so many uncer-
tainties. Both decision tools can also be used to as-
sess the effect of additional information collection 
through exploration. 
The main points are, therefore, that dealing with 
rock slope instabilities involves uncertainties and re-
quires an appropriate decision making process, par-
ticularly when determining and managing the asso-
ciated risks. Tools to do this, including newly 
developed ones, do exist. This should, however, not 
be interpreted that a better understanding of the un-
derlying mechanism is not worthwhile. Research in 
this direction has - and will continue to advance the 
practice of dealing with rock slope instabilities. 
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